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The objective of this study Is to
explore the concept oT postponement as
it relates to capital budgeting deci¬
sions* It is the hypothesis or this
study that the decision to postpone in¬
vestment projects, as distinct from the
decision to accept or reject those pro¬
jects, till, under certain circumstances,
allow the firm to fulfill its financial
objectives to a greater extent than ia
provided by traditional capital budget¬
ing theory.
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INTRODUCTION

On# of the most basic and continuous series
of decisions facing business management in gen*
eral, and the financial manager in particular,
is of a dual nature: ‘ Where shall we put oul?
resent funds (capital employed in the firm) to
est use in the interest of the owners of the
enterprise, or, where shall we obtain additional
resources (new capital added to the firm) to
apply to the unfulfilled needs and opportunities
we see in the enterprise?M1

S

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
The financial management function in any business en¬
terprise is the administration of the flow of funds avail¬
able to the firm*

For specialised purposes the term ”funds”

is sometimes used in reference to cash or near-cash assets
or working capital*

Used in this context the term ”funds1

refers to the entire physical asset worth or total resources
of the firm.
The operations of a firm involve the conversion of
these resources into noncash stocks of assets, and then
reconversion of these stocks back to cash through the sale
of goods.

This process represents the flow of funds through

the firm and is illustrated, in simplified form, in Figure 1.
The stocks of assets are under the direct control of
the several functional areas present in the firm.

The

funds committed for fixed assets and raw materials are
^Erich A. Helfert, Techniques of Financial Analysis (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1963), p. 3*

PiC
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administered by the production area; funds committed for
labor are managed by the personnel area; funds committed
for selling and administration are controlled and directed
by the marketing sector.

The financial sector is respon¬

sible for the over-all collection and distribution of the
asset wealth.
The movement of funds is initiated by the use of funds
for the purchase of goods or materials.

The funds may be

derived from capital contributed by the owners, credit
extended to the firm, or by reduction of cash or other
assets owned by the firm.

At the same time additional funds

are committed to the costs of production and operation
through expenditures for direct labor, administration and
overhead under the control of the production sector, and
finished goods are produced.

The sale of finished goods

is carried out under the control of the marketing sector.
If the sales are for cash, the funds will flow directly
back to the cash reservoir.

If the sales are on credit, the

effect is to shift funds from the stock of finished goods
to the stock of accounts receivable.

Collection of the

receivables will result in flow of funds from the stock of
receivables to the cash reservoir.

This process is contin¬

uous, with the funds of the firm always flowing from one
stock to another and fixilly returning to the cash reservoir
to be used again.

3-

The earnings of the firm are determined by both the
turnover of the stocks (or rapidity of the flow) and the
margin provided by the flow*

If the margin ia positive

(that is, if the benefit received from sale of the product
is greater than the outlay required to produce and sell
It), the level of earnings will be determined by the number
of times the stock of finished goods Is sold or turned over.
This will result in e net Increase In the level of the cash
reservoir.

Unprofitable operations will result in a net

decrease in the level of the cash reservoir.
The flow of funds currently available to the firm is
augmented by additional borrowing, sale of securities,
and sale of fined assets.

Combined with expenditures for

major investment outlays, the regulation of the flow repre¬
sents the major area of decisions facing financial manage¬
ment.

Through regulation of the flow, the financial man¬

agement can maximise the earnings of the enterprise through
increasing the turnover of assets, increasing the margin
provided by the flow, or both.

Uncertainty about the effects

of present decisions due to future events permeates all of
the decisions of financial management because of technolo¬
gical, competitive, end managerial risks present in the
operation of the firm and because of a lack of perfect mana¬
gerial foresight.
Decisions pertaining to either the sources or the uses
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of funds must be consistent with the objectives of the firm.
Helfert symbolizes the interdependency of these decisions
in Figure 2.

2

The base of the triangular relationship shows

the balance necessary between uses and sources of funds,
while the top of the relationship shows that these decisions
must be in line with the specific objectives of the firm.
For example, the decision to Invest in a new plant must be
congruent with the objectives of the firm and the sources
of funds available to the firm.

Likewise, the decision as

to which sources of funds to tap will depend on the use to
which the funds are to be put and the objectives of the firm.
The use of short-term funds to increase the asset base of
the firm, for example, may be inconsistent with a sub-goal
of liquidity of current position.
All of the decisions must be made with respect to the
specific risks, technological, competitive, or managerial,
involved.

Thus, the triangular relationship is set around

the concept of risk.

Further, management must reach a deci¬

sion on the basis of the information it is physically and
economically able to collect and analyze.

Further, manage¬

ment is capable of assimilating only a certain amount of
information pertaining to a decision and this managerial
limit represents a constraint on that decision.
Uncertainty about future events is the over-all framework
2Ibid.. p. HI.
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within which management la forced to perform.

It Is a

constraint not only on the decision as to sources and uses
of funds, but also on the administrative framework and
managerial ability.
The dynamic nature of the business enterprise adds a
complicating factor to the decision framework.

Since fu¬

ture movements of consumer demands, price structures, com¬
petitive conditions and governmental influence can be
estimated with any degree of accuracy for only a relative¬
ly short period, financial management is faced with a con¬
stantly changing time horison.

Decisions made currently

with respect to future actions must constantly be modified
to encompass changes in the elements effecting the decision
as the time horison changes.

CAPITA! BUDGETUiQ
Cap!till budgeting has been defined in many ways, but
all of the definitions involve the idea of decisions relat¬
ing to the choice of sources of funds and the uses to which
these funds should be employed.
a...the economics of capital budgeting...is, the kind
of thinking that is necessary to design and carry through
a systematic program fir investing stockholders money* "3
3Joel Dean, Cs oital Budgeting (New fork:
sity Press, 19 60}^ pTl?

Columbia Univer
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Capital budgeting is a many-sided activity
that includes searching for new and more pro*
fitable investment proposals, investigating
engineering and marketing considerations to
predict the consequences of accepting the in¬
vestment! and making economic analyses to deter*
mine the profit-potential of each investment
proposal.4
• ••the capital budget,••sets forth tho plan for
capital expenditures for a future period. The
composition of the capital budget is determined
not only by the physical requirement of the
business but by the effects that proposed ex¬
penditures will have on financing.5
The matching of funds uses and sources
in line with the corporate objectives is gen¬
erally referred to ns capital budgeting.6
These statements of the meaning of capital budgeting
include decisions relating to short-term uses and sources
of funds as well as long-run uses and sources of funds.
Since budgeting for short periods of time Involves less
uncertainty than budgeting for long periods of time, often
capital budgeting is limited to the narrower concept of
long range planning of sources and uses of funds, treating
•hort-run planning separately.

Since the concepts and ideas

in this paper concentrate on the problems associated with
^Harold Bierman and Seymour Sraidt, yhe Capital Budgeting
Decision (New York? The Macmillan Company, l9oOT, p. 3.

^Helfert, op. clt.» p. 143-

7-

-

capital expenditurea over a relatively long tine horizon,
it will be useful to refer to capital budgeting in terms
of the long range decisions.
Dean breaks the problems of capital budgeting into
four aspects:7

(l) the demand for capital funds, (2) the

availability of capital funds, (3) the rationing of capital
funds, and (4) the timing of expenditures*

Although all

of these aspects are extremely important to correct capital
budgeting practices, the first three have received a great
deal of treatment in the professional literature*

The

fourth aspect, the timing of expenditures, has received
considerably less treatment.

OBJECTIVE OF STUDY
The objective of this study is to explore the concept
of postponement as it relates to capital budgeting decisions*
Postponement is defined as the decision to defer acceptance
of an investment project until a later date*

Traditional

capital budgeting theory provides the basis for this study
but oust be expanded in light of new discussions to allow
Inclusion of the postponement concept as it is developed in
Section III.

These new discussions will be included in the

review of traditional capital budgeting theory presented in

7Dean, op. clt.* p. 6.

Sections I and U.

The review of traditional and current

theory ie net meant to be exhaustive.

Rather, the p&per

will present the portion of theory that the author feels
is germane to the development of the postponement concept.
It is the hypothesis of this study that the decision
to postpone investment projects, as distinct from the
decision to accept or reject those projects, will, under
certain circumstances, allow the firm to fulfill its finan¬
cial objectives to a greater extent then is provided by
traditional capital budgeting theory.
Since all of the following discussion will be couched
in terms of the financial objectives of the firm, it is
necessary at this point to develop these objectives.

OBJECTIVES OF THE FIRM
The establishment of long-run financial objectives
for the firm is generally agreed to be a necessary premise
for discussions of capital budgeting theory and technique.*
The broad objective most often cited is profit maximisation
oven though there is an increasing amount of dissent on
this point.

In Chapter One of his book,

mics. Dean discusses profit-maximisation as a long-run goal
for the firm.

He dispels the dissent on this point in the

following paragraph:

9-
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A business firm is an organisation designed
to make profits, and profits are the primary
measure of its success. Social criteria of busi¬
ness performance usually relate to quality of
products, rate of progress, and behavior of
prices. But these are tests of the desirability
of the whole profit system. Within that system,
profits are the acid test of the individual
firm’s performance.9
Solomon also supports this position:
The over-all business objective which has
been put forward most frequently for purposes
of theoretical analysis i3 that of profit-max¬
imisation. This is the goal which is still
assumed within the main corpus of economics .^0
He continues by analyzing the dissent to profit maximiza¬
tion as a long-run goal.

He concludes that a concept of

wealth maximization based on maximizing the net present
worth of the firm is the most rational operating criterion
for financial management.
The gross present worth of a course of ac¬
tion is equal to the capitalized value of the flow
of future expected benefits, discounted (or capi¬
talized) at a rate which reflects their certainty
or uncertainty. Wealth or net present worth is
the difference between gross present worth and
the amount of capital investment required to achieve
the benefits being discussed. Any financial action
which creates", wealth or which has a net present
worth above zero is a desirable one and should be
undertaken. Any financial action which does not
meet this test should be rejected. If two or more
desirable courses of action are mutually exclusive
(i.e., If orily one can be undertaken), then the
9Joel Dean, Managerial Economics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959), p. 3*
l°Solomon, op. clt.. p. 15*
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decision should be to do that which created
most wealth or shows the greatest amount of
net present worth* In short* the operating
objective for financial management is. to
maximise wealth or net present worth.31
Other theoreticians have put forth goals which* al¬
though based on profit maximisation, differ with respect
to the exact nature of the function to be maximised.
Gordon and Shapiro express the goal in terms of max¬
imising the value of stockholders1 equity:
We state that the objective of a firm
is the maximisation of the value of the
stockholders1 equity. While there may be
legitimate differences of opinion as to
whether this is the sole motivation of man¬
agement* we certainly feel that there can be
no quarrel with the statement that it is a
dominant variable in management's decisions.12
Luts and Luts express the goal in terms of maximising
the rate of return on investors' owned capital.*3
T. Scltovsky sets maximisation of profit par unit of
capital invested* based on an internal rate of return on
a firm's present capital funds, as the relevant financial
UIbid., p. 20.
13k. J* Gordon and Ell Shapiro* ’Capital Equipment Analysis:
The Required Kate of Profit*
October,
1956, ft .Tfrfof^Coi^ratA CapXtq£i ed. Kara
Solomon (Graduate School of Business, The University of
Chicago, 1961), p. 142.
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goal.^
Modigliani and Killer attempt to bridge these differ¬
ences by stating that, under certainty, maximisation of
profits and maximisation of market value are equivalent.
With the Inclusion of uncertainty, however, the goal of
profit maximisation breaks into an undeflnable and unusable
concept.
Under uncertainty there corresponds to
each decision of the fins not a unique profit
outcome, but a plurality of smt/u/ally exclu¬
sive outcomes which can at best be described
by a subjective probability distribution* The
profit outcome, in short, has become a random
variable and as such its maximisation no longer
has an operational meaning.15
The goal of market value maximisation, however, does
provide an operating objective under uncertainty.

The

market price will account for risks assumed in the firm1*
projects, risks involved with the capital structure main¬
tained, growth potential, and earnings* payments made, for
not only are the present owners considered but also pros¬
pective owners.

If current owners disagree with management

and the market overvaluation of the firm, they are free
to sell and invest elsewhere, but they will still benefit
from capital appreciation resulting from management deci¬
sions *
Scltovsky, Welfare and Competition (Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, 19$!J,pT 2087
15?. Modigliani and M. H. Miller, "The Coat of Capital,
Corporation Finance, and The Theory of Investment," The
American Economic Review. June, 195*, in The Management,
ed. Solomon, op. olt., p. 152.
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This coal of market value maximisation la concurrent
conceptually with Solomon's (see footnote 10 of this Sec¬
tion) goal of wealth maximization.

Both are aimed at

maximising the wealth of the owners.
in terms of owner benefit.

Both measure wealth

In Solomon's concept, the net

present worth of the firm actually is owned by the stock¬
holders and, therefore, increasing the net present worth
will increase the owners' wealth.

Although he doesn't

state that wealth is measurable in terms of market value,
the valuation of a stock by the market is based partially
on the expected flow of earnings (or wealth in Solomon's
terms) and thus the two concepts are basically equivalent.
Cheng and Shelton carry this idea one step further:
In the truest sense this (stockholders'
wealth, editor's note) means the sum of mar¬
ket value plus dividends received; in practice
a firm has, at best, limited control over mar¬
ket behavior, so the firm may accept as its
proximate goal the maximisation of earnings
per share. If, for simplification, we assume
the price earnings ratio is constant so long
as the capital structure proportions are un¬
changed, maxi ailing earnings per share and
maximizing narket value are identical goals.
For purposes of this paper we can assume that the
financial

30a!

of the fini is to maximise the v/ealth of

the stockholders.

Wealth is defined as the market price

of the ownership chare and Is directly affected by the
*6pao L. Cheng and John P. Shelton, "A Contribution to
the Theory of Capital Budgeting1 (Unpublished papers. The
University of Massachusetts, The Graduate School of Busi¬
ness Administration, made available by), p. 2.
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earnings per share of the Stock.

If the price-earning*

ratio is constant, the maximisation of earnings per ahare
will maximize the wealth of the stockholder sincem increase
in earnings per share will increase the market price*

For

example, if the price-earnings ratio is constant at 10
and the market price of the ownership share is $100, then
earnings per share are $10*

If the earnings per ahare are

increased to $13 and the price-earnings ratio remains con¬
stant at 10 (which implies the degree of stockholder risk
is constant), the new market price would be $130*

SECTION I

DEMAND FOR FUNDS

In the introduction the triangular relationship be¬
tween uses of funds, sources of funds, and corporate ob¬
ject ires was presented.

It was pointed out that these are

actually Mutually determined factors and decisions relat¬
ing to them cannot be cade in isolation.

However, for

our purposes it is useful to discuss independently each
of the factors in order to elucidate the capital rationing
problems encountered by the firm and the solution techni¬
ques suggested by capital budgeting theory.
Management has always been faced with the problem of
rationing the funds available to the firm among various
investment opportunities considered by the firm.

The list

of investment opportunities represents the firm's demand
schedule for funds.

The Inherent question is:

how should

a firm determine whether or not to invest in a particular
project?

Until quite recently the only answer available

was to invest as long as the return promised by the project
was greater than the cost of the project.

This approach

Involved several problems for the financial manager.

How

can the return on a project be measured in the face of fu¬
ture uncertainties?

How can the costs of capital acquisi¬

tion be determined since both debt and equity funds are pre¬
sent in the capital structure?

15
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With no direct answers for those questions a "rule
of thumb

would often be adopted by management.

One of

these was to relate the dollar return fro* a project to
the original investment outlay to determine the number of
years required for the project to pay for itself.
'’payback period ’ rule night be stated:

This

accept only those

projects which provide a return sufficient to pay for them¬
selves in five years or less."

In studying the capital

budgeting techniques of 4# companies, Istvan found that 34
of them employed the
ceptability.^

payback period’r as a measure of ac¬

The rationale for this approach seems to be

that management can forecast accurately only five years into
the future, and being very uncertain about flows after that
time, it chooses to assume that they are zero.

Thus the

"payback period' method is a pessimistic approach and may
well pass up projects that are, in fact, quite favorable.
Variations on this same theme have been suggested and
used from time to time.

Istvan found that 32 companies em¬

ployed a nontime adjusted rate of return as a decision cri¬
terion.2

This criterion measures the rate of return as the

ratio between average yearly receipt and original investment
outlay expressed as a percentage.

The company would set s

Leeisions. Indiana
-Dowld 7. Iatwa, r^jta^Expfndltpr^^ Hapearch, GradBuslaM* Report *o. 33 (Bur.a» or Buainaaa R...arch, Graduate School of Business, Indiana University, 19&1), P* 91*
2lbld.. p. «5.

16-

-

"cut-off rate" as soma percentage return, say 10 percent.
Projects exhibiting greater returns would be accepted and
those exhibiting smaller returns rejected.

There is con¬

siderable difference between companies with respect to the
measurement of the average yearly receipt.

Some companies

use pre-tax flows; others use after-tax flows; some compant

lea add back depreciation, end so forth.
Hegardless of the method of computation employed, sim¬
ple rate of return "rules of thumb” may lead to incorrect
capital rationing for at least two reasons.

For one, the

payback period, or simple rate of return chosen as the pro¬
per cut-off point is purely arbitrary and may not reflect
accurately the capital cost conditions faced by the firm.
More importantly, it is assumed that all receipts are
equally valuable.

That is, it is assumed that a dollar

received today is worth as much as a dollar received In the
future.

But this is an inaccurate assumption because a

dollar received today can be lent out by a firm and earn
interest and thus it has more value to the firm than a dol¬
lar received in the future.

Further, the dollar expected

in the future may not materialize and thus the firm should
place more value on returns currently expected than those
expected in the future.
Any decision relating to the demand for capital must
consider these factors or fall to the same errors*

17
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The problem can be broken Into two parte*

First, the

decision relating to the acceptance of one project can be
developed and then the decision relating to acceptance of
a number of projects can be analysed.

This differentiation

is necessary because the techniques suggested in the profes¬
sional literature for acceptance or rejection when one pro¬
ject is being considered have been shown to be inadequate
when more than one project is being considered.3

SINGLE PROJECT CASE
The sub-goal that motivates financial management was
assumed in the introduction to be the maximisation of the
market price of the equity ownership share.

If only one

project is being considered, this can be accomplished either
by accepting a project if the internal rate of return (see
footnote & of this Section) expected from the project ex¬
ceeds the cost of obtaining the funds necessary to finance
it or if the net present value of the project when discount¬
ed to the present at a rate equal to the cost of capital is
positive.

The capital cost cannot be considered at the mar¬

gin; that in, we could not say that the cost of capital is
equal to the interest cost of debt if debt funds were obtain¬
ed to finance the project.
3cheng and Shelton, op. clt

The cost of capital is determined

18

-

-

by the over-nil capital structure, for as debt is Increased,
investors may capitalise earnings at a lower rate and thus
decrease the market price of equity.

This would tend to in¬

crease the cost of raising additional equity funds and would
therefore raise the over-all cost of capital*

These rela¬

tionships will be explored in greater detail In Section II.
It is sufficient at this point to note that the cost of capi¬
tal is based on the over-all capital structure and not the
margins1 cost of additional funds.

If the return expected

from a project exceeds the over-all cost of obtaining funds,
the project will increase the a&rleet price of equity and
would therefore be accepted.
The budgeting problem, then, rests partially on the
determination of the expected return.

If we know the outlay

required for a project and the estimated stream of returns
from the project, there is little difficulty in determining
the rate of return.

However, these expected returns must

be adjusted to reflect both the futurity of the receipts
and the uncertainty ©f the receipts.^

These receipts will

be measured after taxes plus depreciation since they repre¬
sent net cash generations.

This net cash generation is the

basis for our computing a rate of return.

We use the after¬

tax generation because the tax effect can be very important
^Lindsay, Robert, and S&met*, Arnold V., Financial Manage¬
ment: An Analytical Approach (Homewood, Ullnola; Richard
D. Irwin, Inc., 1963), chap. 111.
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*t a 52 percent marginal rata and taxes are ever present.
Depreciation acta aa a tax shield and must be added back
to accurately show true not cash gains fro* a project.^
Without considering futurity of receipts, or risk,
we could say that a machine costing $1,000 that returned
total cash generations of $1,100 with no salvage value would
exhibit a 10 percent return.

But since these returns are

obtained in the future, they must be discounted to compare
the* with the present investment outlay in order to compute
a rate of return.

The net cash generation is discounted

first to reflect futurity and secondly to reflect the risk
of not receiving the forecasted return.
In order to simplify the analysis, several assumptions
may be made.

The Investment outlay is assumed to be made

at one point in time.

Further, the cash receipts are assumed

to be level for a certain number of years.

Finally, the pro¬

ject is assumed to have no scrap value at the end of the per¬
iod.

The discussion would be unchanged if these assumptions

were lifted, but the computation would be somewhat more com¬
plex.

Therefore, the inclusion of these assumptions will

allow a more concentrated discussion without losing any
relevance.
As an example, suppose that a $1,000 lnveststent would
^John G. Kemeny, Arthur Schleifer, Jr., J. Laurie Snell, end
Gerald L. Thompson, Pinlte_ Mathematics with,Businf#s Appli¬
cations (Englewood Cliffs, H.J.:Prentice-Hall, Inc., 19&2),
discuss this concept on pages 334-3$*
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return $200 per year tor 10 years and would then be worth¬
less .

Since the cash generated by the project is recetved

during future time periods, we could not say that the total
10 year receipt would be worth $2,000 to the firm today.
When the $200 is received at the end of the first year , it
is worth less than $200 to the firm today since, if it had
been received at the first of the year, it could have beeu
invested in a no risk loan and earned Interest during the
year.

Thus, we must discount the cash generation by the

rate that could have been earned to reflect the present
value of the future receipt*

The concept of present value

is well established in the professional literature and con¬
venient tables are available that give present value factors
for various discount rates and various tine intervals* 4

This

paper deals with annual compounding since the receipts are
realized at the end of each year*

Comprehensive tables

are available for semi-annual, quarterly, monthly, and con¬
tinuous compounding but are not necessary for this analysis*
If ws assumed that a six percent riskless rate could
be earned by the firm, the present value of the first year1 a
receipt would be $200 x *943 * $183.60.

Compounding annually,

the receipt of $200 per year for 10 years discounted at six
percent would have a present value of $200 x 7*360 •
^Thls paper will employ the present value tables found in
Robert If* Anthony, ft&nr.gempnt Accounting (Homewood, Illi¬
nois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., I960).
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n
$1,472*

Thus, tht total rscslpts over the 10 year period

have been discounted to reflect the futurity of the cash
flows from $2,000 to $1,472.

Time, the investment that had

shov;n an annual return of 2C percent ($200/$l,000) has been
reduced to show an annual return of about 15 percent
($147.20/$1,000).*
This 15 percent annual return, however, is for an
assured yearly net cash generation of $200.

Since the firm

is not certain of receiving $200, especially in the later
yearn, the expected return will be less than 15 percent to
reflect uncertainty*

Lindsay and Samets suggest two po3sibls

^Mathematically, this would be!

+ ,

200

200

Tl-TSST2

r'jos

+

^
TTttP
200

$1,472

or, following standard notation such && found in Keraeny,
Sehleifer, Snell and Thompson, op, clt.» p. 320:
200

(l.Of )10 -

ToTfiTonTP

- $1,427

°Another \rx7 of obtaining the discounted rate of return
is to find the discount rate r that equates the present
value of the cash throw-off flow to the present investment
outlay. This is known ae the internal rate of return.
This method assumes that cash generated by the investment
will be reinvested at the discount rate r. Our example
assumes that the cash throw-off will be reinvested at six
percent and therefore some variation between the rates ob¬
tained will be observed.
The internal rate of return shown is about 15 percent.

$1,000

i-

200

TFrT2

.••.

gCO
whom r ^ 15?
TFrP^
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means of accounting for uncertainty.^

The firm could de-

croaso its aatimato of expected yearly net each generation,
or it could increase the discount rate for futurity.
In the first case it is assumed that the management
of the fine will hare some idea of possible cash receipts
and could express these possible outcomes in terms of a
probability distribution.

The algebraic sum of this distri¬

bution (that is, the sum of the possible cash generations
times the respective probabilities of realising those gen¬
erations) would provide the expected value of the yearly
cash generation.

If the variance of the yearly distribu¬

tions were a constant function of time (that is, the variance
of the tenth year is 10 times the variance of the first year),
one probability distribution could be expressed for the re¬
ceipt of a certain amount per year for 10 years, and thus
the expected yearly cash generation could be obtained.

If

the probability distributions could be computed very accur¬
ately, a standard deviation could be used to measure the
dlspersln of the distribution.

This process, however, is

not practical since the probability distributions are not
generally accurate enough to provide a useful basis for
elaborate variance analysis.

Further, as the variance in¬

creases, the expected value shown becomes less meaningful.
Therefore, management will decrease the anticipated cash
^Lindsay and Samets, op. Pit.. chap. ill.
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generation by soma amount x in an attempt to reflect uncer¬
tainty and increase variability of future recepts Instead
of attempting to ascertain the expected value of the cash
generation*
If, in our example, management decided to decrease
projected receipts by 20 percent to allow for uncertainty,
our expected yearly cash throw-off would be $160.10 Using
the discounting technique outlined above, the present value
of the expected flow at six percent discount would be

$160 x 7*3^0 « $1,177*60 or an annual rate of return of
about 12 percent ($117*70/$l,QQO).^*

This 12 percent In¬

cludes consideration of both futurity and risk and is lower
than the 15 percent return observed when only futurity of
receipts was considered.
The second method suggested by Lindsay and Samsts to
reflect uncertainty is to increase the rate used to discount
for futurity.

Instead of using a six percent futurity dis¬

count rate, the firm would increase this rate to 10 percent.
(Four percent would be added for uncertainty since $200 per
year was a 20 percent return and $160 is a 16 percent re¬
turn. )

This Is saying that the firm would equate a $200

uncertain yearly cash throw-off to a $160 certain yearly

10 $200 - (.20 x 200) « $160
lousing the internal rate of return method outlined in
footnote 6 of this Section, the internal rate of return is
about 10 percent. The difference is due to the reinvest¬
ment assumption expressed in footnote 6.
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cash throw-off.
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Tho expected annual rate of rat urn on the

project becomes 12 pareAnt ($200 x 6.145 - $1,229 and
$122/$1,00C - 12 pareant).

Thus, the result in both caaaa

la approximately the anise.
It la easy to aaa that the larger the discount for
uncertainty, the smaller the expected annual rate of return.
Since our decision criterion for the single project case la
to accept the project if the rate of return la greater than
the over-all capital cost, the discount rate for uncertainty
will affect rejection or postponement of projects.

This

aspect will be discussed in greater detail In Section III.

MULTI-PROJECT CASE
Thus far only the case of a single Investment project
has been analysed.

Most writers In the field conclude that

the decision rule outlined above Is valid for the multiproject case as well as the single project case.
ments of this position are presented.

A few state¬

The list Is not ex¬

haustive by any means, but it does reflect current thinking
on this point.
Joel Dean states, "...this cut-off rate of return Is
automatically determined by the Intersection of the demand
and supply curves.

Thus, how much to Invest and what the

cut-off rate should be are two sides of the same coin. ”12
12j)#4nf op. clt.. p. 63.
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In his discussion the ’demand curve" is a list of potential
investments ranked in order of their profitability.

The

'supply curve" is the schedule of costs of capital for
increasing amounts of funds.

Thus, by employing the in*

tersection of these two curves as the proper rejection
point. Dean is saying that the coat of capital is the cutoff rate of return for both single and multi-project cases.
Solomon, in his article,

Measuring a Company's Cost

of Capital,*13 describes the process of capital rationing
In three steps.

First, each proposal should be ranked by

the rate of return it promises.

Then, the cost of each

available source of funds is computed and arrayed In as¬
cending order of cost.

Finally,

A comparison of these two schedules
provides an explicit and correct solution
to the capital-budgeting problem. Succes¬
sive proposals should be accepted from
within the descending array as long as the
prospective yield from each is higher than
the cost of obtaining the increment of funds
required for its financing.*e
In a currently unpublished paper, Cheng and Shelton
assail this idea when more than one proposal is being con¬
sidered.
Despite the fact that the cost of
capital Is the proper hurdle rate for one
13£ara Solomon, "Measuring a Company's Coat of Capital,"
_ ed. Esra Solomon
in The
versity of Chicago,
EcE
linesa, The
(Graiuat
1961).
p
961), pp.
12S-41*

128.
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investment decision considered by Itself,
It is imprecise to apply the cost of capital
as a cut-off point for determining which pro¬
jects to accept and which to reject when the
firm has more than on© investment opportunity
under consideration#15
this disagreement as to the proper cut-off point is
highly important to the development of the postponement con¬
cept since a higher minimum rate will residually involve
rejection or postponement of some projects that would have
been implemented had a lower rate (the cost of capital)
been used#
Cheng and 3helton continue their hypothesis:

"It

is clear that anyone who confines the use of the cost of
capital in capital budgeting to a single investment project
is being theoretically precise
There has been no warning, unfortunately,
th&t the same principal which applies to a single
project cannot be used where several projects
have been ranked# In fact many authors when
writing about capital budgeting have explicitly
stated that the use of cost of capital, as a
hurdle rate for many projects, was a valid in¬
ference from the fact that it will work for one
project* Our point la simply this: for most
firms capital budgeting involves consideration
of more than one project and, therefore, for
these firms the advise of using the cost of capi¬
tal as a hurdle rate for determining which projects
to accept and which to reject is not valid .1/
^5cheng and Shelton, op, -CjL£»» p. 4.

16Ibi4., p. a.

17XfeM..

p- 9.
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They continue with mathematical end graphical proof
of their hypothesis and the reader is directed to their
work rather than a summary here for the evidence presented.
The importance of their work to this paper is the decieion
rule cited by them#

They say:

The firm will always increase earnings
per share If the percentage Increase in proflta
from any Investment project exceeds the percent¬
age increase in capital required to finance that
project# Thus, If some projects which come close
to the coat of capital hurdle rate require a
great deal of incremental investment, it may
turn out that their percentage contribution to
profits (including the profits from more lucra¬
tive projected investments) is smaller than
their proportionate Increase in capital required
and, therefore, earnings per share will be maxim¬
ised by rejecting these investments even though
they promise a return which exceeds the cost of
capital#1$
The optimum hurdle rate is higher than the
coat of capital by an amount which depends on
each investment ladder* This is because addi¬
tional projects require additional capital, and
even for some projects that will yield more than
the cost of capital the percentage increase in
profitability they generate — considering the
profit the firm would have attained as it moved
down the ladder of returns — is less than the
percentage increase in equity capital required#^
An example will serve to clarify this decision rule.
Assume a firm has earnings of $50,000 per year and a capi¬
tal structure composed of 50,000 shares of common stock at
a market value of $10 per share#

mA-,

16

p. 12.

l?B>Ai», p. 22.

Further, the cost of

capital la 10 percent.
$1.00.

The present earnings per share is

The firm's management Is considering the following

investment projects.
’

*

.

!

»

f

<■, "

1

/

•

project
■
»

f /
t
.V / i
#
»
*

investment
outlay

expected yearly
cash throw-off*

*

life of
project

internal rate
of return

^ A

$35,000

$10,000

10 yrse

255?

B

60,000

13,333

20 yrs.

225?

C

40,000

8,333

10 yrs.

16??

D

60,000

7,100

20 yrs.

10??

E

50,000

5,500

15 yrs.

755

4

.risk adjusted as described earlier
This example assumes, as do Cheng and Shelton, that
new capital is obtained from the sale of common stock.20
If the cost of capital were used as the cut-off rate,
projects A through D would be accepted and project E would
be rejected.
-

i

Using the Cheng and Shelton decision rule, the choice
would be made as follows:
20Xf debt funds are employed, it is assumed that the same
proportion of debt ahd equity will be maintained in the
new capital structure as was present in the previous capi¬
tal structure. ftWe assumed new projects would be finc.noso.
in the same proportion of debt and equity as the firm cur¬
rently has. This could be Justified as assuming the firm
has found the capital structure proportions that optimize
or 1satisfice* for it and does not want to change this
ratio• " Cheng and Shelton, op. cit.. p. 19#
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%

EToJect

/5 increase
in warnings

A

20

7

accept

B

22

11

accept

C

11

6

accept

9.5

reject

7.2

reject

0
E

6

increase in
caj2ital„re_«iai£fii

decision

In this case projects D and Z would be rejected, while,
under the conventional cost of capital rule, project D
would ha*e been acceptedU?

1

«

A look at the earnings per share will serve to demon¬
strate that the Cheng and Shelton rule is ifelid where the cost
of capital rule will serve to actually decrease the wealth
ie owners
projects accepted
none

earaiuea per share
4.1.00

A

1.12

A,B

1.23

A,B,C

1.29

A,B,C|D

1.22

A,B,C,D,E

1.27

This schedule shows that the inclusion of project D,
2lHere the assumption of a constant price earnings ratio
is made in order to simplify the discussion. This Is
logical, for as long as the debt-equity ratio remains
constant, investors will capitalise earnings at the same
rate.

as tht cost of capital rule showed, actually decreases the
earnings per share from $1*29 to $1.2$ and thus suboptimises
the goal of the firm.
It is important to note that the Cheng and Shelton
decision rule rests on a lag between the time one project
is initiated and the time funds are secured for the next
project, long enough for the market price of equity to in¬
crease due to the earnings exhibited by the first project.
This lag enables the firm to secure funds for the second
project at the new higher equity market price*

This, in

ay opinion, is a drawback to their argument since this time
lag will not always be present, but 1 feel that approaching
the multi-project ease in terms of proportionate increases
in earnings relating to proportionate increases in capital
required is more valid than applying the single project
rule of cost of capital as a cut-off rate to the multiproject case*
The concept of cqltal cost is important nonetheless,
for the single project caee employs this as the cut-off rate
and Increasing the cut-off rate will tmd to postpone or re¬
ject projects that otherwiss would have been accepted*

Also

I have found discrepancy between the coat of capital deci¬
sion rule and the Cheng and Shelton hypothesis only for pro¬
jects exhibiting a rata of ratum close to the cost of capi¬
tal*

Aa Lindsay and Samsts use the term ’cost of capital,'’

the Cheng and Shelton hypothesis and the singla projact
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case decision rule arc the same.22
in acre detail in Section II*

This will be discussed

An analysis of capital cost,

then, is next in line*

22Lindsay and Sasets, op* clt«» p# 157*

SECTION II

C03T OF CAPITAL

Numerous books and journal articles in the field of
capital budgeting hove discussed the concept of the cost
of capital.

For the purpose of this paper, a complete

review is not in order.

However, several of the leading

books and articles in the field will be examined to show
how the cost of capital affects postponement of investment
projects A
The term ‘’cost of capital

i3 an unfortunate one be¬

cause it has been used in many different ways to imply
different diclsion criteria.

In the past the term was fre¬

quently used to denote costs of specific types of capital
funds such as the coat of debt funds and the cost of equity
funds.

More recently, however, theoreticians generally

agree that the real cost of funds is frequently different
from the explicit cost.

Durand?recognised this fact when

he formulated the concept of "required rate" for investment
proposals in opposition to the premise that the cut-off rate
lln the introduction to his award winning doctoral disserta¬
tion Alexander Barges discusses the concept of the cost of
capital and its relation to capital budgeting. Much of the
following discussion is derived from that source. Ale;
Alexander
Barges
hj-gffgcfr of Capital Structurs on th. Co,. ..of
ewood Cliffs, H.J.: Prentic.-Hall, Inc., 196
tal (E

3

^David Durand, "The Cost of D«bt and Equity Funds for Busi
n«ss," national Bureau of Economic R.a.arch, 1952, in Th.
Management of Corporate Capital. edt Solomon, pp. dt.,
pp. $1-127.
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should be the existing interest rate.

His required rate

was the rate of investment return which would offset the
risks of the project and maintain the value per share of
common stock.
The required rate of earnings...is in a
sense the cost to this corporation of borrow¬
ing the needed money. Of course, it is not
an out-of-pocket cost, but a sort of opportun¬
ity cost — the minimum rate that the new in¬
vestment oust earn without being actually
disadvantaseous to the stockholders.3
This differentiation of real and apparent costs can
be easily realised when the costs of debt funds and equity
funds are viewed simultaneously.

While the interest costs

of debt funds are lower than expected equity costs, the
additional risk of Increased debt will be reflected in
higher equity costs.

The higher cost of equity funds should

therefore be considered as an imputed cost of debt funds.
Since the use of one source of funds can influence the cost
of other sources of funds, the cost of capital is consider¬
ed to be some weighted average of the cost of each type of
funds in the capital structure.
The computation of cost of equity to use in arriving
at this weighted average capital cost is a disputed topic.
While most theoreticians believe that the cost of common
stock capital is the expected rate of return required by
investors, there is disagreement as to whether this return
3Ibid.. pp. 95-96.
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should be neasured In terras of dividends or In terras of
earnings.

On the one hand, J. B. Williams and Bleraan

and Bmidt^ hold that dividends are the ultimate source of
value for a stock and that the cost of equity funds should
be measured by an expected dividend-price ratio.
The cost of common stock capital is equal
to the return required by coiimon a wockholders.
This return can be measured by comparing expectcd future dividends to the present market value
of the common stock. The rate of discount that
equates future dividends for perpetuity to the
cost of the stock is the cost of capital for
common stock capital.5
The cost of retained earnings is also dividend asso¬
ciated.
The cost of using retained earnings i£ therefore
the nlnimura yield that raust be earned on addi¬
tional investments within the company in order
that the additional investment will be as valu¬
able to the stockholder as a corresponding im¬
mediate increase in dividends
On the other hand, Hunt and Williams, Spencer and
Slegelnan, David Durand, Solomon, and others? hold that the
4j, B. Williams. The Theory of Investment Value (Cambridge:
Harvard University Tress, 193ff]| Bierman and Smidt,
5Blerman and Smidt, on. cit., p. 135•
6Ibid., p. 144, italicised in original text.
7P. Hunt and C. M. Williams, Basic frajneas yinance (Ho^ewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc#, 1$56); K. H. ^pencar and L. Siegelman, Managerial UconoalfiA (Hoaewood, Illi¬
nois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1959); Durand, op.
Solomon, The Theory of Financial Management, op. ,ci&. See
also Lindsay and Samets, op. cit.
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expected future earnings are the source of value of a
3tock and that the cost of equity should be measured by an
expected oaroings-price ratio.

They feel that earnings

which are not paid out will enhance the future earnings of
the company and therefore enhance the value of the stock.
Investors should be indifferent as to whether their return
comes from dividends or an increase in the value of the stock.

. i j

...the only valid criterion for the cost of
new equity capital is a refinement of the aimpie E/P ratio. Instead of E, the current earn¬
ings per share, the numerator should measure
man^;ement ’$ best estimate of whet average
future earnings would be if the proposed capi¬
tal expenditure were not k*ad«. Ife shall refer
to this concqt as E*. Assuming that underwrit¬
ing and flotation costs are aero, the ratio
E|/p is the best conceptual measure of the cost
or new equity capital...^
huts and Luts$ suggested making a distinction between

the borrowing rate (the rate at which funds can be obtained)
and the lending rate (the rate which could be obtained out¬
side the firm in the loan market or through investments in
other firms) in order to clarify the budgeting process with
respect to the proper capital cost.

They say:

'’We assume

that the entrepeneur discounts his own profits at an outslds
lending rate which ia constant and is not Identical with the
borrowing rate."10

The lending rate is constant (for any

Solomon^ ’Measuring a Companyrs Coat of Capital,
pp. 130—31•
^huta and Lutz, on. clt.
10M., p. 22.

pp« eft.,
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level of investment) because they assume perfect competi¬
tion in the funds' market•

Homerer, the borrowing rate

"...is an increasing function of the amount he borrows
solely on account of the increasing credit risk assumed
by the lender
of capital*

The lending rate then becomes the cost
It is the rate the firm could earn if it in-

rested its funds outside the firm in commitments which de¬
monstrate risks comparable to the internal Investments
proposed*

The cost of capital would vary as the risk of

the projects varies and the level of investment changes*
Harry Roberts, in reviewing the concepts presented by
Luts and Luts, arrives at a measure of lending rate (or
cost of capital) as follows:
•*«my proposal is that the lending rate should
be measured by the expected rate of return on
equity investments outside the firm that appear
to the entrepreneur to involve a degree of riski¬
ness similar to those contemplated within the
firm* 12
These discussions of capital cost express the tradi¬
tional view that the cost of capital is a definitive concept
and subject to rigid measurement*

Lindsay and Samet*,1^

however, treat the subject in a different light.

They

feel that the cost of capital should be treated as an oppor¬
tunity cost that an investment project must cover in order

nIbid.( p. 22.
12h* V. Roberts, ’Current Problems in the Economies of
Capital Budgeting,” Jmimal of Business, January, 1957, in
The Management of Corporate Capital, ed* Solomon, ftp* c&&*,
p* 200*
Lindsay and Samets, op. cit*
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to be profitable to the firm.

It oust include a provision

to cover additional risks encountered by the firm when a
change in the capital structure is undertaken*
The percentage coat of capital la the minimum
required rate of return that the investment
project must yield if it is to be "profitable*
and hence to be adopted* Since profitability
la defined in term of its effect on the stoekholder t thia required rate la one that will at
least net affect the price of the atock adverse¬
ly. That la, if an investment project le to be
adopted, it must not depress the net expected
returns per share with a constant price/retuma
multiplier; or if the multiplier is adversely
affected by the financing, the increased returns
per share must be more than offsetting* In
short, the coat of capital is an opportunity
coat concept that sets the minimum rate that
the investment must promise to return; at rates
of return greater than the coat of capital at
a rate, the price of the atock can be expected
to rise.14
The Cheng and Shelton hypothesis^ focuses on increas¬
ing the market price of common stock through increasing
earnings per share (with a constant price-earnings ratio)
more than the proportionate Increase in capital requires*
Lindsay and Samets obtain the same end by increasing the
cost of capital, as a cut-off rate, enough to insure an in¬
crease in market price of common due to increased earnings
derived from an investment project*

Note that the approach

used by Lindsay and Samets is not restricted to a constant
price-earnings ratio*

P* H2.
153** Section X.

If the price-earnings ratio declines,

that is, if investors capitalise earnings at a rate lower
than the former rate due to increasing capital needs, the
cut-off rate on investment projects is increased.

Thus,

the cost of capital is no longer a fixed and definitive
rate hut instead is a flexible Investment tool used to as¬
sess Investment proposals.
In computing the cost of capital Lindsay and Swats
include a growth factor^ that will insure an increase in
market price of common due to increased earnings derived
from an investment project.

The cost of new common stock

is the ratio of the expected future earnings if the pro¬
jects under consideration were not undertaken (Ea) to the
net proceeds from the sale of additional common stock
(P

A growth factor is included by an addition to

the current eamings/market price relationship.

rtThis Ea

may he thought of as current E/P plus an anticipated annual
rate of Increase in earnings...

Thus, the cost of com¬

mon stock financing is determined by investor anticipation
of expected future earnings, net proceeds from the new issue
and a growth factor.
*%he reader is directed to Ifaron

sartei

Gordon, Ths_3&ve_

Oharas? isrss*

cuss ion of growth factors in common stock evaluation.

ATthie approach is very similar to that presented by Solomon
"Measuring a Company's Cost of Capital/' op. cit., p. 131*
1 ^Lindsay and Samets, op. cit., p. 144#
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They consider the imputed cost of retained earnings
to bo basically tho same as tho cost of now equity.

How¬

ever, there is a slight difference due to the fact that
new equity flotation involves selling costs (that is, the
net proceeds from the sale of common stock will be less
than the market price) and therefore they conclude that
”...a project financed by new shares requires higher pro¬
mised returns than that financed through plowback of earn¬
ings. "W
In terms of continuous schedules the cost of
finance will rise when internal sources are
exhausted, but this is not the cutoff point
unless the schedule of expected returns from
investment falls below the next scheduled
means of finance.••.*2®
The determination of the cost of debt funds involves
two considerations.

When the outstanding debt is very small

(that is, when the debt/equity ratio is very snail), the
cost of new debt funds is the effective rate of interest
contractually faced by the firm.

However, as the debt/equity

ratio increases beyond some point that leads stockholders
to decrease the rate at which they capitalise earnings,
the cost of debt will increase by an amount great enough

19lbld.. p. 147*
20ibld., p. 147-4$ • This brief susasary does not include
the effect of taxation on the cost of funds. When the
effects of taxation are incorporated into the discussion,
the gap between the cost of new equity funds and tha coot
of retained earnings is widened because tax offacta (and
the capital gsins tax offset) tend to make new equity funds
more expensive.
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to offset the additional financial risk involved In the
higher debt/equity ratio.
This analysis of coat of capital assumes differing
marginal capital cost rates and therefore a kinked supply
curve for capital funds whose shape is determined by the
type of additional funds employed, the present earnings/
price ratio, and the debt/equity ratio.

Implicit in the

analysis is that there is some optimum capital structure
for each level of capital acquisition, and, further, that
the required rate for budgeting analysis will not be con¬
stant but, rather, is subject to fluctuation depending on
the type of capital employed.

Projects which show a rate

of return greater than the cost of capital at that level
of capital acquisition will be accepted.

The cost of capi¬

tal at that point will depend on the types of funds employ¬
ed in the capital structure.
Professors Modigliani and Miller21 have presented an
argument that runs counter to this proposition.

They say

that the capital structure has no effect on the cost of
capital.

They build their thesis on the idea that the total

amount of risk associated with the net operating income of
a firm is independent of financing since risk is a function
ZlKodigllanl and Miller, on. cit«» PP- 150-dl.
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only of the variability of the earnings stream and this
variability is unaffected by the financial structure.
r’...the average cost of capital to any firm is completely
Independent of its capital structure and is equal to the
capitalisation rate of a pure equity stream of its class."^2
They then express the proper decision rule for capital
expenditure programs:
see

will in_all eases be jjjeTPk la aef£nellta the
expected rate of return on the common stock of
an unlevered company in risk class k, editor’s
note) suii vill be completely unaffected
Equivalently, m may say that regardless of the
financing used, the marginal cost of capital to
a firm is equal to the average cost of capital,
which is in turn equal to the capitalisation
rate (p]£, editor’s note) for an unlevered steam
in the class to which the firm belongs.
Thus, in their terms, p^. is the relevant eost of e&plt&l
and is the proper cut-off rate#

They express

of an expected earnings to market/price ratio.

in terms
f,...if pj

denotes the (market, editor’s note) price and ij is the
expected return per share of the jth firm in class k, we
must have:..

3U
Pj

Pk

*24

For purposes of analysis, Modigliani and Miller assumed
^Ibld.. p. 156, italicised in original text.
g3lbld.. P. 173*
24lbld.. p. 155.
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away the effect of taxes.

Their argument rests on the

fact that, as the firm attempts to engage temporarily
cheap funds (debt funds), investors will consider the firm
riskier than they did previously, which will upset the risksafety balance of their portfolio.

In order to restore

this balance, investors will sell the Issuing corporation's
equity shares and purchase the equity shares of another
corporation in the same risk das a as the issuing corporation
before the additional debt was encountered.

This will de¬

press ths market price of equity for the Issuing corporation
and thus the temporarily cheap debt funds will be made more
expensive by the imputed increase in the cost of equity
funds.

Therefore, the cost of capital will bs the cost of

squlty for any given level of capital acquisition regardless
of the capital structure.
In investigating this proposition, Barges2^ found that
empirically the Modigliani and Miller thesis would hold
only within certain limits where the firm was operating at
a relatively high degree of leverage, that is, within cer¬
tain limits of a relatively low debt/equity ratio.

For op¬

erations outside these narrow limits (debt/equity ratios
either above or below), the proposition would not hold.
♦Thus, on the basis of the evidence presented herein, the
2?See Alexander Barges, op., cit.
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hypothesis of Independence between average coat and capi¬
tal structure appears untenable.0^
David Durand27 attacks the proposition on the basis
of the restrictive assumptions that Modigliani and Miller
make in order to build their thesis.

He particularly

attacks the fact that the hypothesis will only hold under
these unrealistic assumptions and that the authors were not
able to approach reality.
Starting with a perfect market in a perfect
world, they have introduced small modifications
in the direction of realism; but they have not
made significant progress in this direction,
considering their avowed aim of achieving an
“operational definition of the cost of capital. '
Their treatment of risk affords, perhaps, the
clearest example. In allowing corporate earn¬
ings to fluctuate somewhat — presumably around
a fairly definite central value — MM /Modigliani
and Miller/ have postulated a world that is not
100 percent riskless; but it is a remarkably
safe world -- being free from the risk of bond
default, margin calls, foreclosures and major
disasters of any sort.2#
Lindsay and Samets also base their criticism on the
need for rigorous assumptions.
The principal objection to this theorem
of "equal cost funds from all sources 1 is that
it requires perfect markets for its execution.
If there be lack of mobility of investorsr funds
Zftlbld.. p. 103.
27David Durand, "The Coat of Capital in an Impwfect Mar¬
ket: A Reply to Modigliani and Millar, " The American
Economic Review, June, 1959, in IhS-.U*Sk£-cr":^H%- _of_Corp3££ic CrpitcJ, ed. Solomon, QE..C&., pp. 182-97.
2&lbid.. p. 196.
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between securities, and limits to their borrow*
lag, psychological and institutional pressures
toward debt securities, and legal restrictions
on buying low-quality bonds or any stock, and
in general lags and frictions in the capital
markets ofwrious kinds, then the lower costs
of particular types of finance could be seised
upon by corporations at various times.29

CONCLUSIONS
In this Section emphasis was placed on insuring that
the firm’s cost of capital, when used as a cut-off rate
for budgeting decisions, would be high enough to reflect
changes In the rate at which investors capitalise the
firm’s earnings due to changes in the capital structure
»

;

and changes in the investiacnt schedule.

«.

The Lindsay and

Satinets’a cost of capital was shown to be consistent with
the Cheng and Shelton hypothesis for the multi-project case*
The risk adjusted schedule showing demand for a firm’s
funds was developed in Section I.

In this Section the

coat of capital was developed as a concept that must be
considered in total at one time but which is subject to
change at the margin due to the securing cf different types
of funds.

This, then, represents a supply schedule for a

firm’s funds.
As long as the cost of capital is always large enough
to be consistent with the Cheng and Shelton hypothesis,
^Lindsay and Samets, op. dt.» p. 1^2.
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the general investment mile can be stated as the interseotion of the supply and demand schedules.

This general

rule provides the base upon which the discussion of post¬
ponement will be developed in Section III.

SECTION III

POSTPONEMENT

In order to Include postponement in present capital
budgeting theory as it was developed in Sections I and II,
it is useful to deal with three eases involving the post¬
ponement concept.

Case one will discuss the postponement

of projects, which would have been initiated had present
budgeting theory been followed, in order to raise the
market price of common equity when a future market entry
is anticipated.

Case two treats the postponing of cur¬

rently desirable projects because of anticipated projects
yielding higher returns.

Case three discusses postponing

projects that would currently be rejected in order to allow
them to ripen into profitable investments.
There may be other cases where postponement would be
advantageous, but I choose to limit the discussion to these
three cases.

The rationale for this restriction is that I

feel most of the situations where postponement would be ad¬
vantageous will be covered in the following discussions and
those cases not covered would be subject to similar analysis.
For example, any project that present budgeting theory would
currently reject can be analysed by the technique explained
in case three to determine if it might become attractive in
the future.

Likewise, the analysis presented in case one

can be used to determine whether or not currently unaccept¬
able projects might become acceptable in the future if a
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market entry is anticipated, and ao forth.
Before entering the actual analysis, it ia necessary
to clear up one factor.

Up to this point, the paper has

used the tens "investment project" to mean any program
requiring an outlay of funds by the firm for expectation
of receipts.

This Included projects in which the firm had

a choice as to implementation time as well as projects in
which the firm had no choice as to implementation time.
This is an inaccurate factor, however, and one that must
be corrected.

There are three main types of projects with

which this paper will deal.^

These I will categorise as

(1) necessary, (2) strategic, and (3) desirable projects.
(1)

necessary projects.

situation of forced action.

In many cases a firm faces a
That is, an investment must be

made before operations can continue.

A machine shop, for

example, might have a central power supply break down.

Be¬

fore it can continue operations, it must either repair or
replace the inoperative power supply.

This represents an

Investment that must be made before the firm is able to per¬
form the function of a machine shop.

Thus, the investment

is necessary and therefore nonpostponable•
(2)

Strategic projects.

This refers to projects which

allow the firm to qmrate profitably but are not a prerequi*The reader may choose to find fault with the categories
chosen, for they are meant only to clarify the point that
only certain types of projects are post ponable and are not
to be subject to rigorous proof.

site for operations*

If the machine shop example is used

again, perhaps a particular tool which allowed the shop to
manufacture a certain part profitably becomes inoperative*
The firm is faced with the decision to repair or to replace*
It would be possible for the part to be manufactured by some
other means, but the cost of such a procedure would render
such manufacture unprofitable*

The decision to repair or

replace2 is strategic for profitable operations*

It is not

necessary, however, since the firm Is free to manufacture
unprofitably.

Since profitable operations are a wise policy

of the firm, postponement of such projects is seldom possible*
(3) Desirable projects are those which the firm feels
may allow more profitable (or more desirable) operations
but which are neither strategic nor necessary, and thus they
are postponable.

Desirable projects are the major class of

projects with which this paper is concerned.
Of course, it is possible for desirable projects to
become strategic or even necessary projects within the firm’s
time horison, but nonetheless they are currently subject to
postponement*

If a desirable project does become strategic

or necessary, it may no longer be strictly subject to the
analysis presented below.

The analysis will, however, be

helpful since it will show the budgeter the extent of the
project’s profitability.
^Assume that the firm is contractually obligated to manufac¬
ture a certain number of the parts so that the decision co
not manufacture is not possible*
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CASE ORE - POSTPONEMENT IN ORDER TO LOWER
CAPITAL COSTS
In Section II it was pointad out that the cost of capi¬
tal funds will increase as the demand for capital funds in¬
creases*

This, of course, assumes that the firm will always

employ the least expensive funds first and then employ pro¬
gressively more expensive funds to meet capital demands.

As

long as some maximum debt/equity ratio is maintained, the
marginal cost of debt funds will be the contractual cost.
The critical dtbt>4quity ratio Is that relationship for which
tha creditors demand no risk premium and for which the stock¬
holders would cot chcige the rate at which they capitalise
earnings.

That is, the possibility of Increased earnings

through leverage just offsets the risk of fluctuations in
earnings due to the fixed charge associated with debt finan¬
cing.

The total cost of funds at that point will be the sum

of the eost of acquiring tha necessary equity base plus the
contractual cost of the dabt.

If the debt/equity ratio ex¬

ceeds the critical relationship, the cost of debt funds
will increase*

Stockholders may dacraase the rate at which

they capitalise earnings, which will Increase the cost of
the debt by the imputed increase in equity cost, or creditors
may demand a risk premium and thus increase the debt cost
directly.
The marginal cost of retained earnings, as was pointed
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out in Station II, is the average current returns/market
price of stock plus a growth factor If applicable.

If

tax effacta are not considered, the marginal cost of - new
equity is more than the coat of retained earnings because
of flotation charges**

Therefore, the total cost of capital

funds is a rising and kinked function of the amount of funds
obtained.
If a firm is considering anterlng the funds market in
the near future in order to finance a lavel of daairable
projects, it will be advantageous to the firm to postpone
certdb presently desirable projects in order to increase
earnings per share more than would have been possible if
the presently desirable projects were currently initiated.
For example, assume that a firm has currsntly invested
in projects which have depleted the funds on hand plus those
that were generated internally during the period.

The firm

still has investment opportunities that yield a risk adjust¬
ed (see Section I) internal rate of return higher than the
cost of capital and sufficient to yield a percentage increase
in capital (the Cheng and Sheldon hypothesis).

If the firm

ware to implement these projects at this time, it would hava
to go into the market for additional funds.

If the funds

obtain! were equity funds and the projects were implemented,
3 Personal Income tax tends to increase the cost of new com¬
mon stock, and thus the difference between the cost of new
common stock and tha cost of retained earnings will be even
greater.

the tamings per share of the stockholders would increase,
as was stated above, since the percentage increase in earn¬
ings would be greater than the percentage increase in capi¬
tal required*

With n constant earnings*/price ratio, this

would increase the market price of the stock.

However, if

the marginal projects were postponed until the funds re¬
quired to finanoe then could be generated internally, the
adoption of the projects at that time would increase earn¬
ings per share a greater amount since the same earnings
would be generated and would be spread over only the exist¬
ing shares outstanding.
If wore profitable projects were then available to the
firm, they could be financed through the aale of addition¬
al equity at a higher market price and thus result in less
dilution in earnings per share.

The price/earninga ratio

also may increase during the period of postponement due to
the possibility of eves higher earnings in future periods
resulting from the new projects which exhibit returns great
er than the postponed project.

If this iaarease in price/

earnings ratio does materialise, it represents an added
bonus to the firm*

However, such an increase could not be

assumed and therefore the analysis will proceed under the
assumption of a constant price/earnings ratio.
By postponement the firm lost the returns that would
have been generated by the postponed project during the
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postponement period.

But this is an opportunity loss to

the firm and would not affect the market price of equity.^
A numerical example will serve to elucidate the point
made here.

Assume a firm with a price/earnings ratio of

10, current earnings of $1,000, and a capital structurs
which includes 1,000 shares of common stock has invested
all of its currently available funds in profitable projects.
However, the firm still has a desirable project, project A,
which 4.11 increase earnings by $110 per year, (an 11 per¬
cent increase in earnings} and which will coat $1,000 to
Implement (a 10 percent increase in capital required).

It

also has a project, project B, which can be implemented
next year which will Increase earnings $200 per year and
cost $1,000.

If the firm went into the market now and ob¬

tained the required $1,000 for project A by selling common
stock (100 shares would be necessary at the $10 market
price), earnings per share would rise from $1.00 per share
to $1.01 per share.
CURRFHY POSITION:
Common stock outstanding:
Price/eaminga ratio:
Current earnings:

1,000 shares

10:1

$1,000 per year

^Assuming a constant price/earnings ratio, the market price
of equity in the future would be lower if the project were
not currently initiated than it would have been h<:ci the
project been initiated. Tills factor is accounted for in
the numerical example and, as is shown, does not alter tie
advisability of poatponement.
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Current earnings per share:

$1.00

Current market price of common:

$10 per share

IP PROJECT A IWPLEMESTED:
Common stock outstanding:

1,100 shares

(1,000 + 100 « 1,100 shares)
New earnings:

$1,110

($1,000 * $110 - $1,110)

/

New earnings per share:

$1.01

($1,110/1,100 « $1.01)

The next year the firm would implement project B and
earnings per share would increase to $1.09Common stock outstanding:

1,199 shares

(1,100 + 99 ** 1,199 shares, 99 shares of new common
would be necessary for project B at the new market
price of $10.10 per share)
New earnings:

$1,310

Hew earnings per share:

(($1,110 + $200 - $1,310)

$1.09

($1,310/1,199 * $1.09)-*

If, however, the firm postponed project K until the
following year (note that project A was a profitable project
the previous year) and financed it through earnings gener¬
ated during the year, earnings per share would rise to $1.11.
IP PROJECT A IMPmtERTED THE FOLLOWING TEAR:
New earnings:

$1,110

Shares outstanding:

($1,000 + $110 - $1,110)

1,000

New earnings per share:

$1.11

5Even if project B were financed from the earnings gener¬
ated during the year, the earnings per share would only rise
to $1,310/1,100 » $1.19. It should be remembered, however,
that the firm intended to go into the funds’ market in order
to finance project B.
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If the fins then eoee. into the market to finance prou
ject B, the ear nlngs per share will increase to $1*20*
BJew earnings:

$1»310

Shares outstanding:

($1,110 4 $200 « $1,310)
1,090

(1,000 + 90

1,090, 90

shares would be needed at the new market price of $11.10)
Slew earnings per share:
r

$1.20

($1,310/1,090 ** $1.20)

Thus, postponing project A, when the firm anticipated
entering the market the following year, lowered the cost of
equity and enabled the firm to increase earnings per share.

The question may be asked, what if the firm didn’t implement
project A at all; that is, what if it were rejected or post¬
poned indefinitely?

In that case the firm would have enter¬

ed the funis’ market the following year at the current mar¬
ket price of $10 per share.

100 shares would have been

necessary to finance project B and the earnings per share
would have increased to only il.09.

Kev earnings;

$1,200

($1,000 4 $200 * $1,200$

Sumter of shares outstanding:
Earninga per share:
The decision rule is:

$1.09

1,100

(1,000 4 100 • 1,100)

($1,200/1,100 * $1.09)

when a firm i3 anticipating a

market entry in the future, it should postpone those pro¬

jects which would currently require market financing but
which could be financed through funds’ generation over the
postponement period, in order to increase the market price
prior to the anticipated market entry.
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CASE TWO - POSTPONEMENT DUE TO ANTICIPATION
OF FUTURE PROJECTS YIELDING GREATER RETURNS
At certain times a firm may have available a currant
investment project which has an expected yield higher than
the risk adjusted cost of capital (see Section H) which
makes it a profitable investment.

However, the firm also

expects to have a project within its time horizon which
exhibits an even higher rate of return for the same in¬
vestment outlay.

If the assumption is made that the firm

does not wish to go into the capital market during the
time horizon in order to finance both projects,^ it must
choose between accepting the current project and foregoing
the greater returns promised by the future project or post¬
poning the current project, placing funds in a short term
risk free Investment (such as four percent government bonds)
and accepting the higher returns from the future project
when it becomes available.

The problem could alternately

be stated by asking this question:

how large must the

expected returns from the future project be in order to
make foregoing of the returns from the present project (due
to postponing that project) profitable to the firm?

Once

this "break-even^ point for the returns from the two projects
is determined, the firm would need only to determine the ex¬
pected return from the future projeet.

If the expected

^This is a reasonable situation since many firms rastrlct
sources for investment funds to idemally generated funds
for long periods of time.
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retum Is larger than the ’break-even* return, the firm
would be wise to reject the current project in favor of
the future project.

If the expected return from the future

project is lees than the "break-even* return, the firm
would accept the current project and reject the future
project.

Rejection in this situation is a fora of post¬

ponement because, as soon as the restriction to current
funds is lifted, the rejected project may be initiated.
As developed earlier, a present value technique may
be adopted, but the major problem inherent in that techni¬
que is the choice of an appropriate discount rate.

The

choice of a discount rate ia very important since choosing
a low rate of discount will make the future higher proceeds
quite attractive and the choice of a high discount rate will
mako the future higher proceeds less attractive.
A further problem is evident depending on the assump¬
tion made with respect to reinvestment of funds generatod
by the two projects.

Should the firm assume funds will be

reinvested at the rate of return exhibited by the projects7
or should tho assumption be made that funds will be reinvest¬
ed at some company-wide average rate as is suggested by
Baldwin?^
7Th±a is inherent in the calculation of an internal rate
of return. See Section I.
^Robert H. Baldwin, liow to Assess Investment Proposals,
Harvard Business Review, May-dune, 1959*
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It the anticipated project is such that Incremental

Investment may be made which will yield the same rate of
return, then the cash throw-off from the present proposal
can be invested at this higher rate when the anticipated
project is available*

Thus, there are three possible re¬

investment assumptions*
Another approach to the problem is to capitalise the
value of the cash generations from the proposals to the
firm’s time horison*

The project exhibiting the greatest

value at that point is the most beneficial to the firm*
This approach allows for the Inclusion of all possible re¬
investment assumptions and also frees the analysis from the
problems associated with choice of a proper present value
discount rate.

However, this approach errs in that tha

firm must make decisions on ths basis of preasnt valus and
not future value*

Though a project exhibits ths greatsat

capitalised value at some point in the future, it may not
exhibit the greatest present value, for its returns may bs
very large in future years and thus have comparatively leas
present valus to the firm than lower earlier returns from
another project*

The capitalised value approach is valuable,

however, in that it allows the inclusion of all possible
reinvestment rate assumptions*

For this reason it will be

used in the discussion of assumptions one and two*

The dis¬

cussion under assumption three will show that the correct
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procedure la a combination of the present value approach
and the capitalised value approach*
The discussion can usefully be formulated in terms of
an example*
years*

Assume that a firm has a time horizon of 10

That is, it feels that ten years Is the longest

period into the future that it can forecast expected re, _

t

turns with any degree of accuracy*

After that time, the

variance In the distribution of possible returns becomes
so large that ft 5b impractical to expect any returns at all
from the projects *

Or, stated another way , the probability

distributions will flatten out in the future to such an
extent that they are rendered useless *

The firm has a pro¬

ject currently available that will cost $1,000 and will
enjoy an expected cash throw-off of $192 per year or four¬
teen percent *9

The research and development department

has assured the firm that a project will be available in
three years that will also cost $1,000 but will yield a
greater caeh thxw-off •

The firm also can invest in risk

free government securities that will yield four percent
per year*

The question, then, is how large must the cash

throw-off be from the second project in order for the firm
to postpone the first project and invest in the second pro¬
ject three years from now?

If the expected cash throw-off

^Receipt of $192 per year for 10 years on a project costing
$1,000 is an internal rate of return of 14 percent*
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ls greater than the minimum required, tha firm will reject
the first project and accept the second project in three
years.

Likewise, if the cash throw-off is less than the

minimum required, the firm will accept tha first project.
The minimum cash throw-off required in order for post¬
ponement to be advantageous will be colored by the reinvest
ment rate assumed*

Therefore, each reinvestment rate as¬

sumption will be treated individually.
ASSUMPTION ONE
The Cash Throw-off from Each Project
Is Reinvested at the Internal Rate of
Return Exhibited by That Project
With the assumption that the cash throw-off from each
project will be reinvested at the rate of return exhibited
by the project, the problem is to find the minimum cash
throw-off for project two that will equate the capitalized
value of project one for 10 years at 14 percent to the cap!
tallsed value of the cash throw-off from project two rein¬
vested at its rate of return, plus the Interest that would
be obtained on the £1,000 invested for three years at four
percent.
Mathematically, the capitalized value of the stream of
earnings from project one is:

lOstandard notation as presented by Kemeny, Schlelfer,
Snell and Thompson, op. clt.» p. 320.
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The compound interest earned on $1,000 invested at
four percent for three years is:
$1,000 (l+.04)3 - 1,000 - $125
The capitalised value of the stream of earnings for
project two is:

y[t^q

x - earnings per year from project two,

(Note that the earnings for project two will only be realised
for seven years since the time horison is ten years and the
project is to be implemented three years hence,)
The minimum cash throw-off required of project two can
be found by solving:

for x and r, where r is both the reinvestment rate and the
internal rate of return exhibited,

fhe values that satisfy

these conditions are where x « $273 and r “ 20 percent.
Thus, project two must exhibit a cash throw-off of at
least $273 per year if It is to be advantageous for the firm
to postpone project one in favor of project two.
easily shown*

This is

The decision rule would tell the firm that

it should postpone project one in favor of project two if
project two were to show an expected cash throw-off of, say,

$300 per year,

it the end of ten years project one would

have a capitalised value of $3»713 as was shown above.

If
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project two had a cash throw-off of $300 per year for seven
years (which is an internal rate of return of 26 percent),
the c&pit&llaed value of Its cash throw-off plus the intereat earned on the $1,000 invested for three years at four
percent would bet

jjtycoO

ic&oj +-

~J

~

^

7oO

which is, in fact, greater than the $3#713 exhibited by
project one.

Thus, the firm would benefit from postponement

as long as project two exhibited a cash throw-off greater
than $278 per year.
ASSUMPTION TWO
The Cash Throw-off from a Project Will Be
Reinvested at the Highest Obtainable Rate
Under this assumption the cash throw-off from project
one will be reinvested at the rate of return that it exhibits
(14 percent in our example) for the first three years and
after that will be reinvested at the rate of return enjoyed
by project two.

The necessary cash throw-off from project

two under this assumption will be found by solving:

?•/?)*- I
If
for x and r.

Notice that after the third year the cash

throw-off from project one will be reinvested at rate r
alto.

Since=%Cand $1,000(1.04P - $1,000
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$125> the equality can be rewritten as:

Hto

Jm

v"-*

It Is easy to see that the cash throw-off from project
two would only have to be larger than the cash throw-off
in order to proride a larger value at the end of the ten year time horison.

Thus, if the assumption is made that the cosh throw-

off from eaeh project can be reinvested at the highest
obtainable rate, project two will only have to exhibit a
slightly larger cash throw-off than project one*
ASSUMPTION THREE
Proceeds Will Be Reinvested at a CompanyWide Average Rate
In the proceeding examples the reinvestment rate as¬
sumption made a great deal of difference in the minimum
cash throw-off required for project two to be superior to
project one*

When reinvestment was assumed at the rate of

return exhibited by the project, project two had to have a
cash throw-off greater than $27# to be advantageous*

With

the second assumption the required eash throw-off fell to
= & 12 S' +-

0

Just slightly higher than the $192 cash throw-off from
project one.

Obviously, the firm is left in a quandry.

The postponement of project one and acceptance of project
two depends on the reinvestment rate assumption.

If the

firm found that project two would generate $250 per year,
it would accept project one, if the first assumption were
made, and would postpone poject one in favor of project two
if the second assumption were made.
determine the appropriate assumption.

The firm is forced to
The correct answer,

however, is that neither of the first two assumptions is
valid*

The invalidity of assuming that funds generated by

an investment project can be reinvested at the rate of
return evidenced by the project Is pointed out by Baldwin.
It is to one critical assumption under¬
lying the usual procedure that I take strong
exception. The future receipts and payments
are reduced to their present value by dis¬
counting t}em at the same rate as that which
the proposed investment is estimated to provide.
In other words, management assumes that, for
the period between the base point and the time
when the funds are spent or collected, the funds
are, or could be, invested at the rate of return
being calculated for the proposal.
This is simply not true....The funds would
be at work during the interim period not at a
rate similar to that of the proposed investment,
but at the average rate at which general corpor¬
ate funds are being invested -- at the over-all
value of money to the company.12
Our previous analysis assumed that future receipts
^Baldwin, op. clt.. p. 99.
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wire equally valuable to the firm*

That is, the analysis

concluded that the project with the greatest value at the
end of the ten year time horizon would be the most benefi¬
cial.

This is not so.

Early receipts will be more valuable
*

to the firm than later receipts.

.

In order to determine the

relative worth of the projects, the firm mast determine
the present value of the yearly cash throw-off from each.
The one exhibiting the greatest present value would then
be the meat advantageous.

The problem is to determine the

present value discount rate.
the above quotation.

The answer was provided in

The firm should discount at a rate

equal to the over-all value of money to the company.
Baldwin defines this rate as, ’’.♦.the rate of net
profit it expects to return on its total assets in the
years to come.'*^3

He continues:

In the last analysis the value of money
must be a judgment determination by management
because it is a projection into the future.
Some good, sound guideposts can be set, however,
by considering the company*a actual performance
over the most recent four of five years and any
reasonable estimates of performance for a few
years ahead.
An individual project may enjoy a rate of return
higher or lower than the average rate, but the cash throwoff from the project will be placed in the firm's treasury
p. 100.
Ujbid., p. 100.
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The decision ruli can be stated:

IT two projects,

both of which exhibit a rate of return great enough to be
profitable, have the ease cost but different implementation
dates, the cash throw-off from the future project must be
at least high enough to show the same present value as the
present project when discounted to the present at the
f

average value of money to the firm in order to be a de¬
sirable undertaking.

CASE THREE - POSTPCMEMEKT TO
BfCEEASE PROJECT BENEFIT
Case three represents a special consideration of post¬
ponement that was introduced by Stephen Marglin*^

This

ease considers the situation of a project whose benefit
changes with the passage of calendar time*

Marglin defines

calendar time as "...a convenient label for the factors
which, quite apart from the age of a project, produce
changes over time in the demands for, and hence the benefits
of, its output*Thus, if a project produces a certain
quantity of a physical good year after year, the benefit
from production will depend on the demand for the good,
rather than on the age of the project*

16jbid., pp. 9-10.

Of course, demand
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plays a dominant role in determining the return from any
Investment.

In case three, however, the effects of changes

in demand are highlighted to show their importance*

This

approach may be employed for determining the benefits of
postponing any project.

For example, take the case of a

plant whose only output is electric power.

The plant la

capable of producing a certain quantity of electricity, but
the benefit from the plant will depend on the demand for
electricity.

As long as the quantity demanded is within

the production capacity of the plant, revenues from the
plant will depend on the demand.

The significance is with

the effect of changes In demand over time on the planning
of the investment project.
In the interest of clarity, only the simplest of eases
will be considered.

This will entail the adoption of assump¬

tions which, although detracting from the reality of the
situation, allow attention to be focused on the problem of
when to initiate Investment projects.
Under certain conditions a project that is undesirable1?
now may become desirable If undertaken in the future.

Simi¬

larly, projects that are now desirable may become more de¬
sirable in the future.

It is not enough to determine only

J-TUndes Arable in this context means that the project exhibits
a negative net present value when costs and receipts are
discounted to the present at the average investment return
rate for the firm. Similarly, desirable means that the pro¬
ject exhibits a positive net present value.

the implementation time that allows the project to show
positive net present value, but, rather, the implementa¬
tion date should be determined that allows maximization of
the net present value*
A numerical example will serve to clarify the point.
Assume that a firm is considering an investment project
that will cost $1,000 regardless of the Implementation date
and will yield a certain benefit stream, net of repair cost,
of $50 per year for years one through 10 (that Is, from
1963 to 1973) end $200 per year for years 11 through 20
(that is, from 1974 to 1964)*

Assume further that the aver¬

age investment rate of return, as defined in case two, is
10 percent*

The assumptions that the dollar cost of the

project will not change over time and that the revenues are
known with certainty are admittedly unrealistic, but it allows
ease of computation without dieting the analysis
If the project were Implemented now (1963), the present
value of benefits would be $761*05*
Present value of benefits from 1963 through 1973•
6*14&9 x $50 - $307*25
Present value of benefits from 1974 to 1964:
2*369 x $200 ~ $473*60
16jy the reader prefers, the cost may be treated as expected
cost and the revenues as expected revenues, both discounted
for uncertainty*
^Anthony,
used*

op*

cit*. is the source for the discount factors
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$307,25 + $473.30 • $731.05
Since the construction cost is $1,000, the net present
value of implementation in year 1963 is negative:

-$213.95*

The project would be undesirable since it would yield a nega¬
tive net present value*

It is possible, however, that the

project may become desirable, that is, yield a positive net
present value, when discounted to 1963 if implemented in fu¬
ture years*

If, for example, the project is Implemented in

In 1970, it will exhibit a positive net present value of
$6.65*
Present value of revenue, 1971 through 1973:
1.277 x $50 - $63.35
Present value of revenue, 1974 through 1934:
2.369 x $200 ~ $473.30
$63.35 ♦ $473.30 - $537.65
Present value of construction cost in 1970:
.531 x $1,000 - $531.00
$537.65 - $531 - $6.65
Therefore, postponement of the project from 1963 until
1970 allowed a currently undesirable project to become de¬
sirable.

However, it is not known whether or not implementa¬

tion in 1970 provides the most desirable level of operations,
that is, the greatest net present value.

To determine the

most desirable Implementation date, Marglin suggests con¬
sidering the marginal benefit from postponement.
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Consider the cost savings of postponement for one year.
If the project were implemented in year t, the present value
of the construction coat would be $1,000(1.10

Likewise,

the present value of the construction cost the following
year, or year t+1, would be ♦1,000(1.10)*^*^).
4

gj

,

v *

j

'

•

<

.

The dif-

»

ference between these two represents the marginal cost
saving of a one year postponement •

Or, viewed in a slightly

different light, this would be the present value of the net
*

benefits from placing the $1,000, made temporarily available
by postponing the project for one year, in a one year in¬
vestment at a 10 percent rate of interest.
Mathematically, this 1st

$1,000(1.10)-* - $l,000(l.lortt+1J

(3.1)

Simplifying, this expression becomess
$1,000

at .10 * (l.lO)-^1) - $100(1.10)-U+1)

(3.2)

Postponing the project one year also naans that the
firm must forego ono year’s beneELt.

50(l.loHt+1)
and

This amounts to:

where t - 0...19

200(1.10)"^fc ^ where t - 20...29

(3*3a)
(3.3b)

The change in net present value from a ona year postponement
(year t to ya&r t+1) ie the difference between the savings
in cost and the loss in benefit which Marglin calls tha
"marginal net present value of delaying construction720 for
one year.

This becomes expression (3*3) minus expression

^^Karglin, op. cit.. p. 14*
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(3*2) ori

050(1*10)**^ ^ where t ** 0.«*19

and

-0100(1.10 T^^where t - 20*.,29
Until 1973# then, (assuming 1963 represent!* year aero)

the marginal net present value of delaying construction is
positive.

That is, the present value of the savings in coat

exceeds the present value of the loss in benefit*

Thus,

*

postponement la advantageous*

From 1974 to 1933, however,

the marginal net present value of delaying construction is
negative and the firm would suffer a loss in marginal net
present value by further postponement.

Therefore, the

maximum net present value is that obtained by implementing
the project in 1973*

The net present value reaches a maxi¬

mum of $37.30 at that point*
Present value of construction cost in 1973**
.336 x 01,000 « 0336
Present value of benefit 1974 through 1934:
1*369 x 0200 * 0473*30
t

,

'

$473*30 - 0336 - $37.30
Thus, delaying, or postponing, this special type of
project until 1973 resulted in an undesirable project becom¬
ing desirable.

This case of a project whose benefit is

dependent on ircalendar time

is not often encountered and

thus was treated as a special case of postponement.

In addi¬

tion, the example used was highly simplified in order to
clarify the discussion.

However, the simplifying assumptions
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could easily be lifted without altering the decision rule.
It is of note that the use of the case three decision rule
can be applied to any project whose benefit depends on
'calendar time,” regardless of whether the project current¬
ly shows a positive net present value or not.
The decision rule can be stated:

the firm will maximise

/

the net present value of any project whose benefit depends
on ncalendar time,” by implementing the project during the
first year in which the marginal net present value of post¬
ponement is positive*

SmmUT OF DECISION RULES RELATING
TO POSTPONEMENT
The attempt of this paper has been to explore the con¬
cept of postponement as it relates to capital budgeting
decisions.
theory.

The decision rules formulated extend present

They cover situations in which the use of present

theory would not lead to the maximisation of equity market
price.

They are intended to demonstrate that the decision

to postpone, as distinct from the normal accept or reject
decision, is a usable tool for financial management.
Case One - Postponement in Order to Lower
Capital Costs
When a firm is anticipating a market entry in the fu¬
ture, it should postpone those projects which would currently
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rpquirc market financing but which could be financed
through funds’ generation over the postponement period,
in order to increase the market price prior to the antici¬
pated market entry.
Case Two - Postponement Due to Anticipation
of Future Projects Yielding Greater Eeturna
If two projects, both of which exhibit a rate of re¬
turn great enough to be profitable, have the same cost but
different implementation dates, the cash throw-off from
the future project must be at least high enough to show
the same present value as the present project when discount¬
ed to the present at the average value of money to the firm
in order to be a desirable undertaking*
Case Three - Postponement to
Increase Project Benefit
The firm will maximize the net present value of any
project whose benefit depends on "calendar time," by im¬
plementing the project during the first year in which the
marginal net present value of postponement is positive.
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